The Logical Realm of Scholarship: Basic Beliefs of Truth, Doubt, and the Pathos of Doubt
There is a specific type of relationship between scholarly statements, theoretical affects, and convictions. This theoretical affect fundamentally aims to judge. Conviction arises not from affect itself but from evidence. Nietzsche argues that scholarship should only be allowed when it lacks absolute conviction. Thus, conviction strictly requires evidence, maintaining a state of lack of conviction. Those presenting evidence should not hold ultimate conviction. This makes their own conviction insignificant. People treat statements, theories, and hypotheses in scholarship as regulatory fictions. This regulates scholarly discourse, always dealing with fiction. Conviction plays an essential role in judgment, but in scholarship, it is not. Here, the absence of conviction matters. In his first interpretation of the logical realm, Nietzsche describes scholarly discourse as producing fictitious statements by emphasizing the lack of conviction. This must be discussed in relation to texts on European nihilism. Nietzsche says eternal return is the most scholarly hypothesis. The pathos of doubt involves limitation and reconnaissance, with doubt never accepted as a judgment but reserved. This is the conviction within the absence of conviction.
The Return of Platonism
People have trust in doubt. Scientists trust doubt, which is an appropriate definition. However, scientists also speak of the return of metaphysical beliefs or theology, implying that faith in scholarship always still relies on metaphysical beliefs. This is the belief that God is truth and truth is divine. In other words, when asking about the pathos of scholarly doubt, we find the same pathos as Plato's is crucial. The logic of exclusion is preserved in modern scholarly research. Nietzsche criticizes the return of Platonism in an atheistic scholarly world. He discusses the problem of deception and non-deception, the issue of pseudo-apate (self-deception). At first glance, it seems Nietzsche replaces truth with appearance, but in reality, he discusses the possibility that only appearances can exist.
Polytropia: The Tactic of the Octopus
Squids and octopuses are pure dilemmas, with the exitless night representing their metis perfectly. Night is their refuge. Just as immobility and paralysis always contrast with continuous movement, shrinkage certainly contrasts with polytropia. The proposed model is the polytropic human with thousands of tactics, showing different faces to each person. This character, known throughout Greek tradition, is Odysseus. Another type is the ephemeros human, enduring various tactics and time to change life. In contrast, the polytropic human excels with calmness, lightness, and brilliance, always maintaining self-control. The difference between octopuses and chameleons and between polytropic and ephemeros humans is seen as the same.
The Pathos of Opinions
The Greeks always thought of our field as the field of opinions. Thus, we live not in the field of truth but in the field of probability. This means recognizing appearances and phenomena is practically impossible. We cannot start by saying we want truth but not appearances. Nietzsche applies the criteria originating in the field of probability, the field of opinions, to the field of scholarship, the field of the logic of doubt. Thus, people form final formats about the discussion subject and use these as judgment criteria.
Liar Paradox: I Lie
The first form comes from the liar paradox of Eubulides of Miletus: "If you say you lie and tell the truth, you are lying." In this space, lies are accepted. This is not a lie opposed to truth but closely related to life. If lies exist in this logic space, it means lies do not exist. Whether this is true depends on the number of times of thought transformation. The executor of this meta-thing prohibits asserting oneself as a statement. This is applicable to modern societal forces.
Opinion and Aletheia
The most interesting point in Gorgias' text is the many themes of conviction. This conviction belongs to the truth of proof and order, opposed to persuasion. Persuasion belongs to rhetorical expression and the order of probability, distinguished by Gorgias. However, presenting conviction and proof is never excluded from this system of persuasion. On the contrary, conviction is one of the possible expressions of speech. Regardless of proof, the important thing is always the Socratic rhetorical expression. Gods are potential liars. But what they say is uncertain. Returning from the play of contradiction to harmony and joy is the will to power, driven by the time of great return.
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